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Abstract
Do Body-Worn Cameras improve police efficiency? This study answers
this question in the context of a sample of local police agencies in the US,
where the adoption of BWCs by police agencies has increased significantly in
recent years. To estimate the effects of BWCs on police efficiency, this study
exploited the differences in the adoption of BWCs between agencies that
acquired them (”acquirers”) and agencies that deployed them (”deployers”).
Using a multiple stage approach, in the first stage the author estimated the
efficiency of local police agencies using a robust order-m model. In the
second stage, the author estimated the effects of BWCs using a range of
matching estimators and an instrumental variable model. The first stage
results show that police agencies could improve their efficiency by 31 percent
from 0.76 to 1. The second stage matching and IV estimates suggest that
BWCs can help improve police efficiency between eight and 21 percentage
points. The effects are larger for those agencies that fully deployed BWCs
with their officers. Overall, this study’s results support the argument that
BWCs can help improve police efficiency.
Keywords: Police, Performance, Efficiency, Data Envelopment Analysis, Matching
Estimators, Instrumental Variables.
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1 Introduction
During the last five years, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of
Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs)across law enforcement agencies in the US. Police
departments of all sizes have acquired and deployed BWCs to improve their
transparency, accountability, and performance (Chapman, 2018). Simultaneously,
research on the impact of BWCs on a wide range of law enforcement outcomes has
also burgeoned.
A growing body of empirical evidence provides support for the use of this
technology to improve various police outcomes, such as accountability, reductions of
civilian complaints against police, police-citizen interactions, citizen behavior,
among others (Lum, Stoltz, Koper,& Scherer, 2019). However, research on the
effects of BWCs on police efficiency, however, remains unexamined. This study
addresses some of these questions by estimating the effects of BWCs on the
efficiency of local police agencies.
To answer this question, the author first estimated police agencies’ efficiency using
well-known methods to measure efficiency in organizations such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (Charnes & Cooper, 1957). In particular, the author
employed a robust approach–order-m– (Cazals & Florens, 2007) that corrects for
known biases in efficiency measurement, such as the presence of outliers and
measurement error.
Secondly, the author used a range of matching methods and instrumental variable
regression to assess the effect of BWCs on police efficiency between agencies. The
use of BWCs by police agencies varies widely. The data show that about 60%1 of
agencies acquired BWCs compared to those that did not. However, not all of the
agencies deployed BWCs with their officers. In fact, out of the 60% of agencies that
acquired BWCs, 84% implemented a partial or full deployment; and only 40% of
the 84% of agencies that deployed BWCs implemented a full deployment with their
officers.
The author exploited this difference between BWCs ”acquirers” and BWCs
1This percentage is based on the final sample used for the analyses, which was 615 local police
agencies. See the section on data for more information.
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”deployers” and conceptualized the ”acquirers” as Intent to Treat (ITT) and the
”deployers” as Treatment on the Treated (TOT). This difference in the adoption of
BWCs allowed me to match agencies on a set of organizational and environmental
characteristics and assess differences in efficiency levels between ”acquirers” and
”non-acquirers”. Then, the author used the ”acquirers” (ITT) measure as an
instrumental variable to examine differences in efficiency between ”deployers2” and
”acquirers” using LATE3 analyses.
The findings indicated that BWCs increase police efficiency between seven and 12
percentage points for the ITT analyses and between 10 and 21 percentage points
for the LATE estimates, thus supporting arguments that this technology
contributes to improving police efficiency and increasing transparency and
accountability in police organizations.
This study’s results contribute to the rapidly growing literature on the use of
BWCs in various ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the first study that examines
the effect of BWCs on police efficiency. The current scholarly and policy literature
on this topic focuses mainly on measuring the effects of BWCs on outcomes such as
transparency, accountability, legitimacy, and on criminal resolution, intelligence
gathering, and criminal justice processes outcomes. Some studies have examined
outcomes like the speed of criminal resolution or criminal justice processes
outcomes. These outcomes approximate an efficiency measure since criminal
investigations, for example, are critical processes of a police production function
because they may lead to more crimes cleared (c.f. Morrow, Katz, & Choate, 2016;
Owens, Mann, & McKenna, 2014). However, none of these studies use efficiency as
their primary focus of research, nor do they produce an actual efficiency estimate.
Hence, in addition to examining the effect that BWCs have on police efficiency, the
author borrowed from the literature on productive efficiency and provide an
estimate of the levels of police efficiency by using a range and inputs and how their
combination contributes to police output (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978).
Second, this study focuses on a sample of 615 police agencies instead of, for
example, a single agency or a subset of agencies within a police district where most
2These are the agencies that are assumed compliant and deploy the BWCs.
3LATE stands for Local Average Treatment Effects. It is the same as Treatment on the Treated
(TOT) effects.
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studies draw their experimental or quasi-experimental evidence from (Kim, 2019;
Ariel et al.,2016; Jennings et al.,2017; Harcourt & Ludwig,2006). Although the
strength and robustness of results from well-designed experiments are irrefutable,
the results of this study are useful because they reveal effects across a larger
number of police agencies and help support the results found in experimental and
quasi-experimental evaluations.
Third, the results of this study can offer useful operational insights for police
agencies becuause the deployment of BWCs can assist them in having higher
clearance rates because of the faster availability of critical information to help them
resolve crimes. In turn, efficiency gains resulting from BWCs can help strengthen
other important areas of police operations.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of
the literature on the use of BWCs, which has focused mainly on experimental
evidence assessing BWCs’s efficacy on a broad range of outcomes related to officer
and citizen behavior, police use of force, civilian complaints, and police
accountability, among others. Section 3 presents the data used in the analyses.
Section 4 presents and discusses the multiple stage empirical approach to first
estimate the efficiency scores and then examine the effects of BWCs using efficiency
as the primary outcome of interest. Section 5 presents the results of the preferred
model and several robustness tests and sensitivity of the results to the presence of
hidden bias. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and discusses the study’s
limitations.
2 Literature Review
There has been rapid growth in the literature on the adoption of this technological
innovation in law enforcement and its resulting impacts on a wide range of
outcomes in the last five years (Lum, Koper, Merola, Scherer, & Reioux, 2015).
Scholars have categorized research on the impact of BWCs around six main areas
of study, including impacts on officer behavior and citizen behavior; officer
attitudes about BWCs; citizen and community attitudes about police or cameras;
criminal investigations; and police organizational structure (Lum, Stoltz, Koper, &
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Scherer, 2019).
The evidence around the impacts of BWCs police efficiency remains largely
understudied. Studies on the effects of BWCs on criminal investigations and crime
resolution are, however, closest to efficiency measurement. Crime investigations are
a critical component of a police production function and are often used as a
measure of police organizations’ efficiency. For example, the time it takes to clear
crimes and the number of resources saved from using BWCs could be interpreted as
a measure of efficiency, and, in fact, previous research on police efficiency has used
these variables as outputs in an efficiency model (c.f. Alda, 2014; Alda &
Dammert, 2019). Thus, this literature review focuses on the strand of research that
more closely approximates the study of efficiency as an outcome, although no
studies to date have used a measure of police efficiency as their primary outcome of
interest. For a thorough review of available evaluations and research on BWCs, see
Lum et al. (2019).
The number of research studies focusing on this proxy of police efficiency, however,
is relatively small, accounting for just 6% of all the published research on BWCs to
date (Lum et al., 2019), and the results are mixed. Studies have examined the
impact of BWCs using the gold standard for evaluations (RCTs) or
quasi-experimental approaches, and ”before and after” approaches as well as
qualitative analyses to support their quantitative findings.
Yokum, Ravishankar, and Coppock (2017) conducted an RCT with more than
2,000 police officers in Washington DC’s MPD to examine the impact of BWCs on
police complaints, police use of force, policing activity, and judicial outcomes. It is
noteworthy that the latter approximates a measure of efficiency in that it captures
the process in which police arrests are prosecuted in the justice system because the
footage produced by BWCs can lead to faster case resolution (Yokum et al., 2017).
Overall, the study found very small effects, none of which were statistically
significant. One potential explanation for the lack of results is that the researchers
did not have access to the full prosecutorial datasets but only dataset with the
police department’s initial charges.
While Yokum et al. (2017) offer a range of thorough explanations for the lack of
results, the simpler and most likely explanation is that BWCs do not affect the
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outcomes studied. In the case of the efficiency proxy, the camera footage did not
affect judicial outcomes. The study concludes by nuancing the message around the
expectations of BWCs as well as encouraging more research on the impact of
BWCs (Yokum et al., 2017).
Owens, Mann, and McKenna (2014) also conducted an RCT to measure the impact
of BWCs using sample of 308 police officers in Essex, UK, focusing on reducing bias
in the results of incidents attended by officers. The authors also interviewed officers
in the treatment group to better understand the operational challenges of BWC
deployment.
Their findings suggest no differences in the number of incidents sanctioned between
officers who wore BWCs and those who did not. However, they suggest significant
differences in the type of detected sanction that resulted in criminal charges in the
treatment group compared to the control group–81% vs. 72%, respectively.
The study’s qualitative findings indicated that officers who used BWCs experienced
more accountability and paid more attention to their behavior while conducting
policing activities. The study concludes with a hypothetical statement that BWCs
could be useful in increasing the proportion of detected offenses resulting in
criminal charges, particularly in domestic abuse cases (Owens et al., 2014).
A recent study used the LEMAS BWCs supplement survey to examine the causal
impact of BWCs on a range of performance and police use of force outcomes by
exploiting the variation in the adoption of BWCs adoption (Kim, 2019). Kim’s
study departs from previous research on BWCs because it examines the impact
using a national survey of over 1,000 agencies instead of a single agency or group of
agencies within a police district. The princial finding suggests a 54% drop in citizen
deaths resulting from police use of force. Furthermore, the study argued that
investing in BWCs could yield substantial benefits to police agencies in reducing
lawsuits resulting from use of force incidents (Kim, 2019).
Katz and colleagues (2014) and Morrow, Katz, and Choate (2016) employed a
reflexive comparison4 approach to examine the impact of BWCs on complaints
against the police and the processing of domestic violence cases in a precinct of the
4Reflexive evaluation or comparison compares the outcomes of the same group before and after
program participation.
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Phoenix, AZ, Police Department. The latter outcome could also be considered an
efficiency measure. The post-test results for the officers using cameras indicated
that cases were more likely to be initiated by the prosecutor compared to pre-test
data (40.9% vs. 34.3%). Morrow et al.(2016) concluded that BWCs could also help
improve officers’ productivity in addition to reducing civilian complaints.
Finally, Ellis and colleagues (2015) assessed the effects of BWCs in Isle of Wight,
UK, on a range of crime offenses, changes in criminal justice processing, complaints
against officers, and officers’ views on the use of BWCs. Since all police officers
were issued BWCs, the results of the study also used a reflexive comparison
approach. The findings related to criminal justice processes on domestic abuse cases
suggest an increase in the number of cases from 3 to 21, and in 10 out the 21 cases,
there was recorded footage. Furthermore, seven of these 10 cases led to arrests, and
four of the seven cases led to criminal charges. The authors acknowledge that,
because all officers received BWCs, the evaluation did not lend itself to any type of
randomization within that police organization. Thus, in the absence of an RCT,
their objective was to assess the effectiveness of BWCs from an operational angle
for agencies that decide to have an agency-wide rollout of BWCs (Ellis et al., 2015).
Of the above five studies, it is worth noting the significant differences in the
methodological approaches and related findings. Except for Kim’s study, the two
studies that used more robust evaluation approaches (i.e., RCTs) show null results
or limited results compared to those that rely on a reflexive comparison approach,
showing significant improvements related to the use of BWCs.
Although informative, reflexive comparison studies have serious limitations impact
because these approaches attempt to examine program impacts by comparing
outcomes before the intervention and after the intervention. The time difference
between these two periods is considered the program’s impact. These approaches
generally assume that program participants’ outcome would have been the same as
before the intervention. Research shows, however, that this is not the case (Gertler,
Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2016), thus limiting the validity of
their findings. It is noteworthy that although these studies are limited in their
statistical validity and their impacts, they still provide informative lessons
concerning the implementation and operationalization of BWCs.
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Despite the rapid growth in evaluations undertaken on BWCs effects on a wide
range of outcomes (Lum et al., 2019), research on the effects of BWCs on police
efficiency remains nascent. The strand of research presented above, which closely
approximates the analysis of efficiency, offers interesting insights on the potential
impacts that using BWCs might have in improving police performance. As noted
above, however, none of these studies estimate a proper measure of police
performance by considering how police inputs contribute to police output
production. This study seeks to bridge this gap by studying how BWCs contribute,
if at all, to improving police performance related to an important police
output–clearance rates. Section 3 discusses the data and methods used in this
research.
3 Data
The dataset constructed for 2016 consisted on information from local police
agencies, crime data, and socioeconomic and demographic indicators from a variety
of sources. Data on BWCs availability and use and police inputs come from the
Law Enforcement Management Survey (LEMAS) (BJS, 2016). The LEMAS survey
collects data from various law enforcement agencies in the US, including sheriff,
state, and local agencies. In this study, the sample is limited to local police
agencies because they are the law enforcement entities closest to citizens and,
therefore, is where most interactions occur. Limiting the sample to local police
agencies yielded efficiency estimates that more closely estimated their performance
from an efficiency perspective.
Data on police outputs come from Kaplan’s crime dataset (Kaplan, 2020), which
contains multi-year concatenated UCR data for state and local police agencies
across the US, and the socioeconomic and demographic measures come from the
American Community Survey (ACS). To capture socioecononomic and
demographic changes in municipalities5, the author used ACS 5-year average data.
5The level of disaggregation in the ACS survey collects information on socioeconomic and
demographic conditions that could affect police output production. Using a five-year average is
to account for any variation in socioeconomic and demographic factors since these measures may
suffer little variation from year to year.
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Before discussing the empirical approach, it is worth noting that there are potential
drawbacks in using non-parametric efficiency models which warrant careful
consideration because biased efficiency estimates can result. Another potential
limitation is the presence of missing data. Because police agency data come from
the LEMAS survey, there is missing information since not all agencies respond to
all questions or did not have sufficient information to answer the particular
questions. Thus, to mitigate the effects of missing data on the efficiency estimates,
the author eliminated those agencies from the sample where there was missing
information on police inputs prior to merging it with the UCR and ACS datasets
A second potential drawback is that all non-parametric models require meeting the
positivity property; that is, that all inputs and outputs must be positive numbers
(>0). If this positivity property is not met, it could render values infeasible,
resulting in invalid estimates because there is no possible solution to the linear
programming model (Bowlin, 1998).
Research and methodological literature identify various ways to deal with this
problem in DEA. One approach is to eliminate those observations with zeroes, and
another is to add a sufficiently large constant so the observation meets the
positivity property. This approach, while methodologically simple, can lead to an
additional problem: translation invariance.
Translation invariance occurs when the addition of a constant alters the efficiency
frontier and yields biased estimates since not all DEA models are translation
invariant (Lovell & Pastor, 1995). It is noteworthy that Ali and Seiford (1990)
developed a model that relaxes the positivity requirement by adding a constant,
resulting in an affine displacement of the efficiency frontier, but does not alter it. In
other words, adding a constant would push the efficiency frontier further to the
right, but would not alter the frontier and, therefore, , not bias the efficiency
estimates. This condition, however, works only if a constant is added to the
outputs in variable returns to scale models, and to the inputs and outputs in
additive modelsdescribe additive model in a footnote (Ali & Seiford, 1990; Lovell &
Pastor, 1995).
As is described in the methodology section, the used of a variable returns to scale
model, enabled me to fulfill the positivity and translation invariance properties by
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deleting those inputs with values =0 and adding a large enough constant to the
outputs. Thus, after pre-processing the data to correct the potential drawbacks
described above, the final study sample is comprised of 615 local police agencies.
To estimate the efficiency scores, the author followed previous literature on police
efficiency and employed a model with four inputs and two outputs (Alda, 2014;
Alda, Giménez, & Prior, 2019; Barros, 2007; Garćıa-Sánchez,
Rodŕıguez-Domı́nguez, & Parra-Domı́nguez, 2013; Gorman & Ruggiero, 2008). The
inputs include both the number of full-time sworn officers and non-sworn personnel,
as well as number of marked and unmarked vehicles (see Table 1).
Defining police agencies’ output is especially challenging as the ”bottom line” of
policing continues to expand and, as a result, so does its production technology6
(Moore and Braga, 2003). The challenge is finding output measures that can
capture–to the greatest extent feasible7–key functions of police agencies.
One measure commonly used as an output in police efficiency studies is the
clearance rate (see Barros, 2007; Alda 2014; Alda et al., 2019). Clearance rates
capture critical functions of police operations, such as the effectiveness of patrols,
speed of police response, and police investigative capacities (Moore and Braga,
2003). In this study, the author approximated police output production by using
the total number of index violent and index property crimes8 cleared by each
agency.
Index crimes are a collection of four violent and property crimes that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses to produce their annual crime index. Violent
index crimes comprise murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, and property
index crimes consist of burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson9.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the raw data on police inputs and
outputs. On average, agencies had 266 sworn officers and 71.3 civilians (non-sworn
officers); approximately 106 marked vehicles and 72 unmarked vehicles. The total
number of index property crimes cleared is about twice the total number of index
6This refers to what police agencies do.
7Limitations in data availability compound this challenge.
8Efficiency models operate better when using units instead of rates.
9For an explanation of these crimes, please visit the FBI. Jacob Kaplan offers useful guidance on
the advantages and disadvantages of using index crimes vis − á − vis using these crimes separately.
10
violent crimes cleared with 560.8 and 299, respectively.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics-Input/Output Set
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inputs
Number of Sworn Officers 615 266.15 763.64 5 12042
Number of Non-Sworn Officers 615 71.28 180.26 1 2871
Number of Marked Vehicles 615 105.80 218.71 2 3797
Number of Unmarked Vehicles 615 72.19 140.78 1 1624
Outputs
Total Index Violent Crime Cleared 615 299.99 795.74 1 12806
Total Index Property Crime Cleared 615 561.82 870.51 1 8291
Source: Own Analysis based on data from BJS(2015) and Kaplan (2020).
4 Methodological Approach
4.1 Conceptual Issues
As indicated above, modern policing has an ever-expanding ”bottom line”(Moore
and Braga, 2003), and consequently, it is challenging to capture the police
production function in a single model.
Production efficiency theory posits that if a decision management unit–that is, a
police agency in this study–produces the same or higher output levels using the
same or fewer inputs, it would be efficient relative to its peers with similar
characteristics (Ray, Kumbhakar, & Dua, 2015).
A key aspect of using BWCs is that it enables officers both to resolve cases faster
and reduce paperwork and, as a result, there is an increase in the number of crimes
cleared (Chapman, 2018). In turn, a higher percentage of crimes cleared would lead
to higher police output production. At the same time, if police increase their output
production using fewer inputs (i.e., police officers) because BWCs yield more
readily available data and information in the investigative process, efficiency would
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then improve. Furthermore, research indicates that using BWCs also helps officers
increase arrests, thus leading to a quicker resolution of cases (Katz et al., 2014).
While trying to pinpoint how BWCs contribute to improving police efficiency is
challenging, using an output measure, such as clearance rates, which encompasses
critical police operational activities, is useful in shedding light on this issue.
4.2 Analytical Strategy
In this section, the author presents and discusses the two-staged empirical approach
employed to measure the effect of BWCs on police efficiency. In the first stage, I
estimated police efficiency scores using an output oriented model with variable
returns to scale. In the second stage, the author used a range of matching
estimators to assess the effect on police efficiency of agencies that acquired BWCs
(”acquirers”) compared with those agencies that did not acquire BWCs.
Matching helps balance confounding (observable) characteristics between police
agencies. This approach, however, assumes that the deployment of BWCs is
exogenous to police efficiency, given a set of observable characteristics. That is, if
the exogeneity assumption holds, then the estimates are unbiased (Cavatassi,
González-Flores, Winters, Andrade-Piedra, Espinosa, & Thiele, 2011). However, as
noted earlier, it is virtually impossible to match police agencies on all the
characteristics driving the adoption of BWCs. Therefore, it is possible that
differences in unobservable characteristics between both groups of agencies exist
and could lead to biased estimates.
To address this potential bias, the author used instrumental variable regression to
examine the effect of BWCs ”deployers” as compared to ”acquirers” on police
efficiency and thus reduce potential biases due to unobservable differences between
each group. This is discussed in more detail in section 4.4.3.
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4.3 First Stage
4.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
In the first stage, the author employed a well-known non-parametric efficiency
measurement approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to estimate the
technical efficiency of local police agencies. DEA is a powerful tool for estimating
organizational efficiency and has several distinct advantages as compared to, for
example, parametric approaches like regression analysis.
First, DEA is flexible and can accommodate multiple inputs and outputs
simultaneously; this results in obtaining a more accurate measure of efficiency of
complex public-sector organizations, like the police. Second, non-parametric
techniques provide information on how DMUs can improve their efficiency based on
the distance from the best practice efficiency frontier. For example, the results of
an output-oriented model can indicate to researchers how much output an agency
could increase in order to improve efficiency (relative to the best performers) while
keeping the input set constant. Third, DEA does not result in common statistical
problems, like multicollinearity or heteroskedasticity, and DEA does not require
normality in their distribution (Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, & Seiford, 2013), or the
imposition of an ’a priori’ functional form as it is the case in regression-based
models.
To estimate efficiency, DEA uses the linear combination of DMU’s10 that employ a
set of inputs that are under the control of police managers–officers, vehicles– and a
set of outputs that the agencies produce, that is clearance rates and crime
prevented, for example.
This linear programming combination generates a ”best practice” frontier, which
captures the organization/s production of maximum output/s given their set inputs
relative to their peers in the sample (Charnes et al., 1978). Therefore, a DMU that
is on the ”best practice”11 frontier has a value of 1, indicating that, relative to its
peers, it has produced more output using the same or fewer inputs and is,
10The DMU (Decision Management Unit) is the unit of analysis. In the case of the current study
is local police agencies.
11This is the efficiency frontier.
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therefore, more efficient.
When using frontier methodologies like DEA or similar linear programming models,
defining the type of model orientation is important. There are two main
models–input and output orientation. An input-oriented model measures how much
a unit (for example, a police agency) could reduce its inputs while maintaining the
same output level. In contrast, an output-oriented model measures how much a
unit could maximize its output production with the same number of inputs.
Therefore, this study employs a DEA output-oriented model with variable returns
to scale (VRS).
The use of an output orientation is primarily the result of the type of output that
defines police agencies’ production technology. As discussed above, on of police
agencies’ key objective is to call offenders to ”account”, which is typically measured
by the clearance rate (Moore & Braga, 2003 p.38). Therefore, from the point of
view of police production, clearance rates are outputs the police should maximize.
The choice of variable returns to scale is also straightforward since an additional
input would not result in a proportional change of the output, as it is the case of
constant returns to scale models. This is because police forces normally generally
operate in a non-market environments with imperfect competition and budgetary
constraints (Jacobs, Smith & Street, 2006; Giménez, Keith & Prior, 2019).
Consequently, police agencies often operate at an inefficient scale size. In order to
support (or reject) the choice of returns to scale, the author conducted a
non-parametric returns to scale test (Simar & Wilson, 2002), and the results
rejected the null hypothesis (p<.01) that police agencies operate at an efficient
scale12, and thus, the choice of variable returns to scale model is appropriate.
Equation 1 below presents the basic output-oriented DEA model with variable
returns to scale. Max θ
s.t.
∑
n
j=1 λjxij = xio i = 1, 2, ..., m;
∑
n
j=1 λjyrj = θyro r = 1, 2, ..., s;
∑
n
j=1 λj = 1 j = 1, 2, ..., n.
12This would mean that a constant returns to scale model would be more appropriate to analyze
efficiency.
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λj ⩾ 0 j = 1, 2, ..., n.
(2)
where DMUo represents a DMU under analysis, and xio and yro are the ith input
and rth output for DMUo.The value of θ ranges from 0 (inefficient) to 1 (efficient) .
Thus, in an output-oriented model, a value of 1-θ indicates the proportional radial
expansion in output that a DMU could achieve given their input set.
Despite their power and flexibility, non-parametric efficiency methods also have
significant suffer from limitation limitations. For example, Because of their
non-parametric nature, it renders them sensitive to the presence of outliers and
measurement errors, which can lead to biased estimates. As discussed above, since
the data used in this study are from a survey, the data are likely to suffer from
measurement error.
Furthermore, differences in the size, location, and output produced by the agency
will make some agencies outliers13 compared to the rest of the sample because they
perform significantly better than their peers. Therefore, this group of outlier
agencies could define the ”best practice” efficiency frontier and bias the efficiency
scores downward because no other agency can perform better than this group of
outliers.
Partial frontier models, such as order-m, enhance efficiency analyses and mitigate
some of the common statistical problems in non-parametric techniques like DEA
(Cazals, Florens, & Simar, 2002; Simar & Wilson, 2008).
Partial frontier methods operate as follows. To estimate the efficiency score, the
order-m algorithm finds an m number of units (police agencies) with similar
characteristics in their input/output set and then calculates how much an agency
could produce using the same or fewer inputs than its peers. In this particular
methodological approach, the choice of m is relevant when estimating the efficiency
scores (Felder & Tauchmann, 2013). For example, choosing a value of m that is too
small would yield a large share of super-efficient observations and, as the value of m
increases (m →∞), the share of super-efficient observations decreases to zero14.
13In efficiency analyses, outliers are also known as super-efficient or super-performers.
14The maximum efficiency score would be 1.
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While there is not a recommended value of m, research suggests choosing a value
that would yield 10% of the observations being super-efficient (Bonaccorsi, Daraio
& Simar, 2006). For this study, the author chose a value of m = 8015, which is
considered a large value. In multi-output studies like this, however, the values of m
tend to be larger than for single output studies (Felder & Tauchmann, 2013).
Furthermore, the choice of m enables the detection of outliers, which helps explain
whether there are particular characteristics of these agencies that make them
outliers as compared to their peers (Daraio & Simar, 2007). In addition, because
the efficiency frontier is not bounded from above at 1, outperforming agencies
(outliers) can yield efficiency scores that are larger than 1 and will not bias
efficiency estimates downward. Consequently, the resulting efficiency estimates are
closer to the ’true’ efficiency frontier compared to a DEA model (Daraio & Simar,
2007). This last feature is potentially useful in studying police forces because their
inherent heterogeneity will be reflected in internal organizations, practices, use of
resources, and, ultimately, in the production process itself. When performing
efficiency analyses of police forces, outliers will emerge, and this technique enables
researchers to understand why those observations in the sample perform
significantly better than their peers.
4.4 Second Stage-Matching and Instrumental Variable
Regression
4.4.1 Matching
In the second stage of this study, the author employed a range of matching
estimators to assess the effect of BWCs on police efficiency. Because this study is
based on survey and administrative data, it was not possible to randomly assign
agencies into treatment and control groups. Therefore, to be able to compare the
effects of agencies that acquired and deployed BWCs with those that did not, it
was necessary to create groups that were roughly similar based on a set of
observable characteristics.
15The author conducted efficiency analyses for different values of m. They are not reported here
but available upon request.
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Matching methods enable researchers to generate a credible counterfactual–that is,
what would the efficiency levels be in the absence of BWCs?–, by creating two
comparable groups based on observable characteristics. Consequently, the results
on the efficiency scores could be attributed to the effect of having integrated BWCs
into their policing functions. In addition to being able to generate comparable
groups, matching methods reduce selection bias (Cavatassi et al., 2011; Guo
Fraser, 2010).
To match police agencies, I used two questions from LEMAS survey:
• Has your agency acquired body-worn cameras?
• Have body-worn cameras been deployed to officers in your agency?
The first question enabled the construction an Intent to Treat (ITT) variable
comprising all the agencies that acquired BWCs (”acquirers”) regardless of whether
or not they deployed them. The second question enabled the construction of a
Treatment on the Treated (TOT) measure which captures all agencies that had
acquired BWCs and deployed them with their officers (”deployers”). It was possible
to generate the latter measure because, according to the responses of the survey,
84% of agencies that acquired BWCs had implemented a partial or full deployment.
Some researchers have argued that some studies of BWCs suffer from potential
selection effects because agencies choose to adopt BWCs technology for a variety
reasons, such as consent decrees, the agency’s interest in improving their
performance, accountability and legitimacy, state and local laws mandates, or
organizational characteristics (Maskaly, Donner, Jennings, Ariel, & Sutherland,
2017). For example, larger police agencies may have budgets to adopt and fully
implement this type of technology. Nowacki and Willits (2016), however, showed
that this is not always the case. In their study of organizational drivers of adoption
of BWCs, they found that agencies prone to using technology in their operational
activities appear more likely to adopt innovative technologies such as BWCs.
Conversely, the size of operational budgets and the presence of unions appear to
hinder the adoption of this type of technology in order to prevent limitations in
police discretion.
Matching methods can also help reduce potential selection biases associated with
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the adoption of BWCs as well as minimizing Type I errors (Guo & Fraser, 2014).
As discussed above, however, it requires both a strong exogeneity assumption and
no lurking unobservable variables that could bias the results. Because police
agencies are complex organizations (Maguire, 2003), it is virtually impossible to
match agencies on all the variables influencing the adoption of BWCs. The author
tried to address this issue by first matching agencies on a set of exogenous factors
and internal organizational characteristics influencing the adoption of BWCs, and
then conducting additional tests to determine whether the results could be affected
by hidden bias due to the influence of unobservable characteristics. In the next
sections, the author presents and explains the data, the empirical strategy, and the
findings.
Although matching algorithms can yield consistent and robust estimates on the
effects of BWCs on police efficiency, using only the ITT sample would yield
conservative results because the ITT sample includes those agencies that only
acquired BWCs and those agencies that deployed BWCs with their officers.
(Gupta, 2011). This would underestimate the effect of the actual deployment of
BWCs somewhat because agencies may acquire BWCs, but might be
non-compliant due to limited capacity and organizational management to
effectively deploy BWCs (Hyland, 2018; Nowacki & Willits, 2016). The author
employed an instrumental variable (IV) regression to conduct the TOT analysis to
examine the effect of BWCs ”deployers” compared to ”non-deployers” and obtain a
more precise estimate of the effect of BWCs on police efficiency.
The TOT analysis yields what is known as the Local Average Treatment Effects
(LATE) estimates. Imbens and Angrist (1994) argue that LATE estimates capture
the average treatment effect among those exposed to the treatment. In this study,
it would capture the effects on the efficiency of those police agencies that deployed
BWCs.
4.4.2 Matching Estimators
Matching can be accomplished in several ways. One of the most well-known
methods is propensity score matching (PSM). The propensity score defined as the
probability of receiving treatment conditional on a set of observable baseline
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characteristics ei = Pr(Zi = 1∣Xi) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) (see 2 for the
variables used to match agencies).
To estimate the propensity, the author used a probit regression model16 to predict
the probability of being treated by an intervention. The propensity score allowed
the author to construct two similar groups17 based on a set of observable
covariates. Thus, any differences in the levels of efficiency between these groups can
be attributed to the adoption of BWCs.
To examine causal effects using observational data, Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983)
argued that two assumptions must be met. The first assumption is the
”unconfoundedness assumption”,which states that outcomes on the treatment and
control groups are independent of participation status conditional on a set of
observable covariates (X). This is illustrated with the following equation:
(Y (0), Y (1)) ⊥ D∣X
The second assumption that must be met in propensity score matching is the
”overlap assumption”, which states that observations with the same observable
values can be in the treatment or control group (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The
following equation illustrates the overlap condition:
0 < P (D = 1∣X) < 1
Figure 1 illustrates the density curves before and after matching using the
propensity score. After matching, the figure shows no significant differences
between BWCs ”acquirers” and ”non-acquirers”.
Recently, however, matching methods such as PSM have sparked a debate about its
effectiveness in generating balanced samples to assess impact. For example, King
and Nielsen (2019) argue that PSM might achieve the opposite of a balanced
sample leading to inefficiency, model dependence, and biased estimates (King &
16Probit and logistic regression models are the most common approaches to estimating the
propensity score, although researchers have examined other approaches.
17To remind the readers, the two groups the author created are: ”Acquirers” and ”Non-Acquirers”
(ITT) and ”Deployers” and ”Non-Deployers” (LATE)
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Figure 1: Density Curves-Unmatched vs. Matched Samples
Nielsen, 2019 p.2; Iacus, King & Porro, 2012). To address these shortcomings, the
authors proposed a new approach–Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). This
approach finds exact matches, one with that has adopted BWCs and one that has
not, instead of matching on propensity scores.
The CEM approach coarsens the exogenous covariates, divides them into different
strata, and then performs an exact matching within each stratum (King & Nielsen,
2019). A major trade-off of matching is that it requires researchers to choose which
covariates to match agencies with. This challenge is evident when using CEM
because if the strata are too complex, the likelihood of finding an exact match is
lowee and, it is more difficult to conduct estimations (Vigneri & Lombardini, 2017).
Jann (2017), however, argues that it is possible to conduct matching when using
algorithms that do not throw away good matches18. In this study, the author used
a wide range of matching algorithms, including CEM, in order to check the
consistency of the results across various models.
18Jann (2017) argues that the results presented by King and colleagues appear to be based on
the worst possible matching approach: one to one exact matching without replacement.
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4.4.3 Instrumental Variable Regression
While useful and informative, the ITT analyses may not provide an accurate
estimate of BWCs effects on police efficiency since matching methods rely on the
assumption that the adoption of BWCs is exogenous to the outcome given a set of
observable characteristics Xi as shown in equation (1) above. The main advantage
of using an IV approach, when a valid instrument can be found, is that it deals
with potential bias from observable and unobservable differences in BWCs adopters
and non-adopters. This method can also be used to test the exogeneity assumption
used in propensity score matching (Ravallion, 2005). Relaxing the exogeneity
assumption, however, requires finding a valid instrument, which must be strongly
correlated with the adoption of BWCs but it cannot be correlated with the error
term. In impact evaluation studies, it is common to use ITT as an instrument since,
as evident in this study, all police agencies that acquired BWCs have the option of
deploying them, but not every agency does. As noted earlier, out of 84% of in the
sample that deployed BWCs, only 40% deployed them fully with their officers.
To estimate the LATE effects, the IV approach requires two stages, and each stage
is illustrated in the equations below:
BWCsi = δZi +ϕXi + vi (First Stage)
θi = βXi + B̂WCsi + ǫi (Second Stage)
where the first stage captures the relationship between instrument Zi and the
adoption of BWCs, and ϕ captures the relationship between instrument Xi and the
adoption of BWCs. In the second stage of the 2SLS model, B̂WCsi captures the
predicted adoption of BWCs estimated in the first stage. The variables vi and ǫi are
the error terms of the first and second stage of the model (Cavataassi et al., 2011).
The first stage is estimated as a linear probability model. Angrist (2000) suggests
using this approach when the first stage is a limited dependent variable model and
argues that it is consistent and safer since using other models, such as probit/logit,
in the first stage will only be consistent if the model is exactly correct.
The author used two measures of BWCs deployment to conduct the IV analyses.
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The first variable captured those agencies that implemented a partial deployment
of BWCs with their officers, and, the second variable captured those agencies that
permanently deployed BWCs with their officers. The estimates on the full BWCs
deployment are likely to be larger than the partial deployment because agencies
that partially deployed BWCs did it for testing purposes or for particular
assignments and, consequently, may not exploit the benefits of this technology.
Table 2 present summary statistics of the set of observable characteristics used to
match police agencies and as explanatory variables in the IV regressions. Based on
prior research and theoretical tenets in organizational theory, the author used a set
of exogenous and organizational characteristics that could influence the adoption of
BWCs (Alda, 2017; Alda & Dammert, 2019; Alda, Giménez, & Prior, 2019; Barros,
2007; Gorman & Ruggiero, 2008). These include total population, population
density, the unemployment rate, the GINI coefficient of income inequality, the
poverty rate, the adoption of other technology, the number of prevented civilian
complaints against officers; and important organizational structure characteristics,
such as the size of the police agency, operational budget; and measures of
organizational complexity, such as functional and vertical differentiation. The first
of the variables of organizational complexity captures how a police agency assigns
tasks within its organization, and it is measured by the number of specialized units
in each agency (Nowacki & Willits, 2018; Maguire, 2003). The second
organizational complexity variable measures the hierarchy within an agency, and it
is measured by the midpoint salary difference between the highest and lowest rank
officer (Nowacki & Willits, 2018; Maguire 2003).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics-Observable Characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population Density 615 3738.05 4450.13 217.56 53766.98
Population Estimate (2012) 615 124195.46 259902.74 702 3857799
% Population with less than High School 615 13.46 7.68 0 55.17
Unemployment Rate 615 7.86 3.16 1 22.15
GINI Coefficient of Income Inequality 615 0.45 0.047 0.31 0.62
Poverty Rate 615 16.24 7.74 0.61 43.25
All crimes recorded 615 6645.55 14905.18 0 172294
Civilian Complaints (Reciprocal*) 495 0.17 0.262 0.001 1
Police Agency Size 615 2.62 0.53 1 3
Acquired Car Dashboard Cameras 600 0.71 0.454 0 1
Budget (Ln) 598 16.47 1.417 12.723 20.951
Functional Differentiation 602 4.652 6.690 0 137
Vertical Differentiation 581 69116.98 34697.86 1195 246771
Source: BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020).
* The reciprocal value approximates the total number of civilian complaints prevented by each
agency.
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5 Results
Table 3 presents the overall efficiency estimates and the estimates disaggregated by
police size. The mean efficiency score was 0.76, indicating that, on average, police
agencies that are inefficient relative to the best performers could increase their
outputs (crimes cleared) by 31 percent (from 0.76 to 1). Larger and smaller police
agencies perform better with efficiency scores between 0.84 and 0.79, respectively.
The efficiency score for mid-size police agencies was 0.60, suggesting that they
performed worse compared with their larger and smaller peers.
Table 3: Order-m Efficiency Estimates
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall Efficiency Score 0.76 0.45 0.00 3.28
Police agency (1-10 Officers) 0.79 0.30 0.25 1.00
Police agency (11-100 Officers) 0.60 0.40 0.01 1.68
Police agency (¿100 Officers) 0.84 0.46 0.00 3.28
Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020).
Figure 2 illustrates the efficiency results by output. It reflects the maximum level of
output produced by municipal police forces given their inputs. Police forces with
values at or above 1 indicate that they performed better in their output production
than the number of m agencies used as comparators.
Figure 2: Order-m Scores
There is, however, significant variation in the levels of efficiency. Out of 615
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agencies, only 28 were efficient (θ = 1), less than 5% of the sample and were
distributed between small and mid-size agencies. It is worth noting that some
agencies were very inefficient and others were super-efficient relative to their peers,
with efficiency scores as high as 3.3. To explain this result in more detail, an
agency with an efficiency score of 3.3 means that it cleared as much as three times
more output than a similar m number of peers. In the Annex, figure 3 presents the
same results without outlier agencies–θ > 1– and more clearly shows the variation in
police performance.
Table 4 presents the estimates on the effects of BWCs on police efficiency using a
range of matching estimators and instrumental variable regression. The ITT results
that agencies that acquired BWCs have a positive, strong, and statistically
significant effect on police efficiency. The estimates are remarkably robust and
consistent across model specifications. Improvements in efficiency range from eight
to 12 percentage points, depending on the model. The regression adjustment model
yielded the smallest coefficient, whereas the mahalanobis distance estimator yielded
the largest coefficient. Regression adjusted models in matching estimators add an
additional layer of robustness because they reduce additional bias in the covariate
balance, ensuring consistency in the estimates, which might explain a slightly
smaller estimate in the analyses (Abadie & Imbens, 2011 p.1).
In regard to the IV estimates, the first stage criteria show that the ITT is a valid
instrument in the model because it is positive, strong, and statistically significant
in the first stage and the instrumented variable is also positive, strong, and highly
significant in the second stage. The F -statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the
instrument is weak with values well over the accepted ’rule of thumb’ threshold of
F > 1019 (Cuesta & Alda, 2012). Furthermore, tests for over-identification and
endogeneity assumptions show that there are no over-identifying restrictions and
the tests accept the null hypothesis that the instrument can be treated as
exogenous. The latter supports the exogeneity assumption needed for the matching
estimators (Cavatassi et al., 2011).
As expected, the IV (LATE) estimates are larger in magnitude than the ITT
19New research questions the use of the F > 10 as the rule of thumb for first stage estimates. Lee
and colleagues (2020) suggest that F -statistic values should be larger than 104.7 in order to have
a true 5% t-ratio test. As Table 4 shows, the first stage F -statistic value is >104.7
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estimates. This is because the LATE estimates capture the effect of BWCs on
those agencies that deployed BWCs compared to those agencies that acquired
BWCs but did not deploy them. The results indicate that agencies that deployed
and permanently deployed BWCs improved their efficiency between 12 and 21
percentage points, respectively. This suggests that controlling for both observable
and unobservable characteristics, agencies that deployed BWCs experienced greater
efficiency gains, thus supporting the argument that the use of BWCs can help
improve police efficiency.
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Table 4: Regression Results
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.124*** 0.100** 0.103** 0.112** 0.105** 0.079** 0.086** 0.109** 0.125*** 0.209***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.072)
Constant 0.669*** -0.427 -0.687
(0.0314) (0.503) (0.522)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446 446 446 415 446 446
R2 0.02 0.30 0.30
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 301.3, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 11.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 268.11, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
Notes:
All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses were
done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
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Table 5 presents the predicted efficiency scores for each matching algorithm and the
IV models for each group of police agencies; that is, ”acquirers” vs. ”non-acquirers”
and ”acquirers” vs. ”deployers”20. The predicted efficiency scores are significantly
higher, about ten percentage points in the ITT analyses and 20 percentage points
larger between ”acquirers” and ”deployers” in the LATE results.
Table 5: Predicted Efficiency Scores
Non-Acquirers Acquirers Acquirers Deployers*,**
MD 0.678 0.802
PS 0.694 0.795
RM 0.693 0.796
NN-3 0.706 0.818
NN-5 0.712 0.817
RA 0.712 0.798
DWPS 0.718 0.798
CEM 0.667 0.783
IV 0.667 0.859
IV-2 0.667 0.860
Avg. 0.695 0.797 0.667 0.859
* Partial Deployment. ** Full Deployment.
5.1 Robustness Checks
Although the results are consistent across matching and IV specifications, the
presence of outliers could drive the second stage estimates, given that the
proportion of super-efficient agencies is relatively large. Therefore, to check
whether these outliers drive the second stage results, the author dropped from the
sample those agencies with efficiency scores larger than one and re-estimated the
matching and IV models. Table 6 in the Annex presents the result and show, on
average, slightly smaller effects, although the LATE estimates are slightly larger
than those of the preferred models in Table 4 above.
As an additional robustness test, the author re-estimated the efficiency scores using
the reduced sample; that is, the resulting sample after eliminating the observations
20Predicted efficiency scores for deployers include those agencies that partially deployed BWCs
and agencies that implemented a full deployment of BWCs.
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that had efficiency scores > 121. Table 6 in the Annex presents the estimates. The
results are still strong and statistically significant across matching estimators and
the IV regressions, and do not substantially alter the results of the preferred model
specifications (see Table 4 above). The average of all the effects are slightly larger
in the preferred model specifications–0.115 vs. 0.109 percentage points–, which is
driven by the ITT estimates.
The reduced sample of the original order-m scores to ⩽ 1 shows that BWCs improve
efficiency between eight and 11 percentage points for the ITT estimates and 13 to
23 percentage points for the LATE estimates. Conversely, the results on the
re-estimated efficiency scores on the reduced sample (see Table 7 in Annex) also
show positive, strong, statistically significant effects of BWCs on police efficiency.
The magnitude of the coefficients ranges from 13 to 16 percentage points for the
ITT estimates and from 20 to 34 percentage points for the LATE estimates. The
coefficients are larger probably as a result of the sample being reduced by 166
agencies. Also, the efficiency estimates have changed because the number and type
of comparators (agencies) in the sample differ from the base sample and that
invariably influences the generation of the efficiency frontier.
The author also conducted the matching and IV analyses on the group of
super-efficient police agencies (θ > 1) (see Table 8 in the Annex). These results
indicate no effects of BWCs on efficiency among the super-performing agencies22.
A concern with efficiency estimation is the potential imbalance in the data because
of differing magnitudes in inputs and outputs. One way to address this issue in
DEA and DEA-based analyses is to mean-normalize the data to ensure similarity in
inputs and outputs across units (Sarkis, 2007). The author proceeded to
mean-normalize the inputs and outputs, estimate the efficiency scores, and use
them as the outcome in the matching and IV analyses.
The results indicate that the mean efficiency scores were slightly lower than the
preferred model–0.68 compared to 0.76 (see Table 10 in the Annex). This reduction
in the efficiency scores is likely the result of mean-normalizing the data, which may
21The reader should note that even after dropping outlier observations, the analyses will still
yield super-efficient observations.
22It is worth noting that the N for these analyses is substantially smaller–166– and will likely
affect the results.
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lessen the influence of outlier agencies in the model. The matching and IV results
are smaller in magnitude compared to the preferred models, but are still positive
and statistically significant (see Table 9 in the Annex). For the ITT analyses, the
effects of BWCs on police efficiency range from six to ten percentage points, and
for the IV models, effects range from 11 to 18 percentage points.
Finally, Table 12 in the Annex presents the estimates of a basic DEA model using
an output-oriented and variable returns to scale model. As discussed above it is
plausible that super-efficient agencies may drive the efficiency scores.Therefore, an
order-m model would prevent these agencies from setting the efficiency frontier–at
= 1 and introduce bias by pushing the rest of the units downward and causing a
higher percentage of agencies to become inefficient (Epstein & Henderson, 1989).
The results show a significant drop in efficiency scores to an average score of 0.46
compared to the average of 0.76 in the order-m model. These results help validate
the use of an order-m model to obtain more accurate efficiency estimates. Table
presents the matching and IV estimates. Similar to the preferred models, the ITT
results indicate that acquiring BWCs has a positive and statistically significant
effect on police efficiency. The ITT estimates range from four to seven percentage
points23. Similarly, the IV estimates are positive and statistically significant, and
the size of the coefficients indicate effects ranging from five to 10 percentage points.
5.2 Hidden Bias
The author further checked the sensitivity of the results to the presence of hidden
bias driven by unobservable factors that could influence the adoption of BWCs. As
noted earlier, several internal and external organizational factors and operational
factors can influence decision-making in the adoption of BWCs. Therefore, the
results should not rule out the possibility of the presence of hidden bias. Gangl and
DiPrete (2004) argue that although propensity score matching24 removes most of
the bias due to observable characteristics, it is not a consistent estimator if hidden
23The regression adjustment estimates are positive but no longer statistically significant at
conventional levels (p < .05).
24Note that propensity score matching is one of several matching algorithms the author used in
the analyses.
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bias is present (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004, p.272).
5.2.1 Rosenbaum Bounds
First, the author used the Rosenbaum bounds test to examine how the results
would be affected in the presence of hidden bias from an unobserved confounding
variable. It is noteworthy that the presence of hidden bias does not invalidate the
results rather, they convey important information on how large the effect of an
unobserved variable must be in order to change the conclusions inferred from the
original estimates (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004).
To conduct the analysis, the author set the maximum value for Γ, at 1 with
increments of 0.1, which are considered appropriate for these type of data (Keele,
2010). Γ values start at 1 and indicate no presence of unobserved confounders, and
the p-value should hold if there is no hidden bias present. The results suggest that
the critical value Γ at which the p-value is no longer statistically significant at
conventional values is equal to 1.7 (see Table 15 in the Annex). Thus, in order to
question the study’s results, an unobserved variable would have to affect the log
odds of adoption of BWCs by a factor of 1.7.
5.2.2 Simulated Confounder
Second, the author used the simulated confounder approach proposed by Ichino,
Mealli, and Nannicini (2008). This approach assumes that a binary variable ⋃ can
be simulated and used as another observable characteristic in the matching
analysis. The primary underlying assumption of this approach is that the both the
observable characteristics and the simulated confounder can influence the adoption
of BWCs.
The results demonstrate the extent to which the baseline estimates are robust to
the failure of the conditional independence assumption. The author employed two
variables to conduct the simulated confounder analyses on the original outcome
variable–police efficiency. The first variable is the size of the police25, and the
25Generating the simulated confounder requires a binary variable. Thus, I generated one where
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second variable is the use of dashboard computers. Both variables are likely
associated with the adoption of BWCs. Using a nearest neighbor and kernel
matching. Table 16 in the Annex presents the results showing positive and
statistically significant effects of both the baseline and the simulated confounder
model. The coefficient of 0.11 suggests negligible differences between the baseline
and the simulated confounder estimates. Furthermore, as recommended in Ichino et
al. (2008), both the outcome and selection effects are positive (>1). Like the
Rosenbaum bounding approach, these results confirm the robustness of the
estimates in the preferred models.
5.2.3 Relative Correlation Restrictions
Finally, the author used the relative correlation restrictions (RCR) methodology
proposed by Krauth (2016) to construct informative bounds on the effects of BWCs
on police efficiency and assess how these estimates behave to deviations from the
exogeneity assumptions (Krauth, 2016, p. 2). This methodology assumes a
correlation between the adoption of BWCs and the unobserved variables relative to
the correlation between the variable of interest and the observed exogenous
characteristics. The author examined the potential effect of a correlation between
the adoption of BWCs and unobservable characteristics that is 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1,
and twice the correlation size between the adoption of BWCs and the observable
characteristics the author employed for the matching and IV analyses (Desai &
Joshi, 2013).
Table 17 in the Annex presents the results. The first row shows the OLS regression
point estimates in the absence of hidden bias (λ=0), while the remaining rows
present the point estimates for up to twice the correlation between the adoption of
BWCs and observable characteristics. The RCR results suggest that the point
estimates are robust to a weak correlation–0 and 10 percent– between the adoption
of BWCs and observable characteristics. Although the bounds on the effect are
narrow and close to the OLS estimate, however, these are not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the RCR bounds show no effect at
moderate or large correlations (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) as the bounds include 0. Thus, the RCR
large police agencies take a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.
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results may raise concern on the influence of unobserved confounding variables on
the matching estimates.
Overall, the signs and magnitudes of the effects of BWCs on police efficiency are
robust to different matching estimators and potential hidden bias.
6 Conclusions and Limitations
This study examined the effect of BWCs on police efficiency using a sample of local
police agencies in the U.S. in 2016. The author conceptualized the adoption of
BWCs across local police agencies as those agencies that acquired BWCs and those
that deployed them, either partially or fully, with their officers. This differentiation
created two groups: (1) an Intent to Treat (ITT) group for all the agencies that
acquired BWCs, and (2) a Treatment on the Treated (TOT) group for those
agencies deploying them. To examine the effects of BWCs on police efficiency, the
author employed a two-stage analytical approach.
In the first stage, the author estimated the levels of police efficiency using an
efficiency model that is robust to the presence of outliers and measurement error
inherent in administrative and survey data. Specifically, the author used an
output-oriented and variable returns to scale model because organizations like the
police should maximize the output produced (clearance rates) using the same or
fewer inputs.
In regard to efficiency, the estimates suggest that police agencies have room for
improvement. The efficiency scores range from 0.60 to 0.84, depending on the
police agency’s size, with an overall mean of 0.76. In other words, on average,
police agencies could improve their performance by increasing 31 percent of their
output production–that is, their clearance rates– using the same or fewer inputs.
Furthermore, the results showed that over 100 agencies were deemed super-efficient.
This means that these agencies produced between more than 1 (efficiency score >1),
and as much as three times more output than similar peers using the same number
of inputs.
In the second stage of the analyses, the author employed a range of matching
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estimators and instrumental variable analyses using the efficiency scores as the
outcome of interest. The results were positive, strong, and statistically significant
across all matching and IV models. The ITT estimates suggest an improvement in
efficiency between seven and 12 percentage points, and the LATE estimates suggest
an improvement in efficiency ranging from ten to about 21 percentage points. The
effects on efficiency gains are substantial. For example, if police can increase
efficiency by an average of 11 percentage points26,the number of crimes cleared
would increase from an average of 430 violent and property crimes cleared to an
average of 494. Such an increase amounts to an average of 64 more crimes cleared
annually through the deployment of BWCs.
The author also conducted robustness tests and examined the sensitivity of the
results to the presence of hidden bias. The robustness tests suggested that, after
re-analyzing the models, the presence of outliers does not affect the estimates’
strength and robustness, and, if anything, the magnitude of the effects increased
from an average of 11 to 12 percentage points. The sensitivity analyses suggest
that the models are robustness to the presence of hidden bias except for the
relative correlation restrictions approach. The RCR results showed mild robustness
to the presence of unobserved factors that could question the robustness of the
estimates in the preferred models. Altogether, the findings of this study provide
strong support to the argument that the adoption of BWCs can contribute to
improving police efficiency, among other aspects of policing.
There are several important caveats to keep in mind with this study. First, the
study sample is limited to only local police agencies. The LEMAS survey collects
data on a much larger sample of law enforcement agencies and includes the sheriff,
county, and state police, among others. Therefore, any inferences based on these
results should be attributed to local police agencies and not as effects that can be
generalized across law enforcement agencies. In addition, due to data limitations
and missing data for a number of agencies, the data required pre-processing and, as
a result, ended up reducing the sample to 615 local police agencies.
Second, there are limitations related to the number and types of police inputs. The
LEMAS survey does not contain data on key inputs in a police production
function, such as computers, phones, and GPS, among others. The use of
26This is the average of all the regression coefficients in the LATE models in Table 4.
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technology, paired with adequate organizational and management changes, is
important in improving efficiency (Garicano & Heaton, 2010; Milgrom & Roberts,
1990). For this study’s purposes, the author was able to use two key police inputs,
which are the number of police officers and the number of civilian personnel.
Third, the author could not capture in the analyses the variation in the adoption of
BWCs. The data indicate that some agencies had acquired BWCs 10-15 years ago,
and some acquired them as recently as 2016, the year the BWCs survey was
implemented. Since 2012 the number of police agencies that have adopted BWCs
increased by more than 500% from 19 in 2013 to 121 in 201527 (see Figure 3 in the
Annex). Therefore, it is possible that the early adoption of BWCs may have
influenced the efficiency results since those agencies had more time to become
familiar with using this technology. One possible way to address this issue in future
research is to conduct temporal analysis and estimate yearly efficiency levels since
the shape of the efficiency frontier, and the units that generate it may change from
year to year.
Finally, although this study deliberately focused on local police agencies, they still
face variations in their technology sets due to differences in organizational
structure, financial and human resources, and the operating environment. For
example, the efficiency results indicate that the number of super-efficient agencies
is somewhat large and driven by mid-size and large agencies. While the methods
used in the first and second stages helped address differences between agencies
significantly28, variation still exists in agencies’ technology sets, which ultimately
affects the generation of the efficiency frontier (O’Donnell, Rao, & Battese, 2008).
Thus, modeling the production frontier to account for differences in technology sets
would yield efficiency estimates that compared the performance of agencies with
peers having similar technology sets. Unfortunately, sample size limitations did not
permit the author to model police production function under different technology
sets.
Considering these caveats, the findings nevertheless raise an important question on
the mechanisms through which the use of BWCs improve police efficiency. This is
important from an operational point of view. It is challenging to shed light a priori
27This is based on this study’s sample.
28Note that eliminating the super-efficient observations did not substantially alter the estimates.
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on how BWCs cameras could improve police efficiency, given limitations in data
that would allow researchers to model the complexity of a police agency’s
production function. This study, however, offers some potential channels.
Research shows that using BWCs generally contributes to reducing the time needed
to clear a crime and send it to the next phase within the criminal justice system
(c.f. Morrow et al., 2016). Furthermore, historical research on clearance rates
appears to provide support to this argument. Scott and colleagues (2019) suggest
average historical trends, despite showing significant stability, there was substantial
variation among agencies in their clearance rate performance. Organizational
changes and other factors were the primary drivers of variation (Scott, Wellford,
Lum & Vovak, 2019).
Another potential channel is the compounding effect that BWCs can have on
improved performance as a result of faster police response times. For example,
recent evidence suggests that faster police response times can improve crime
clearance rates by as much as 4.7% (Vidal & Kirchmeier, 2018). If faster response
times alone can lead to higher clearance rates, the enhanced data and information
that BWCs can collect could be an influential factor in improving clearance rates.
Of course, organizational factors and external factors beyond police managers’
control invariably influence an agency’s performance (Alda & Dammert, 2019). As
Scott and colleagues(2019) suggested, differences in organizational characteristics
could explain variation in clearance rate performance. Hence, having adequate
organizational factors conducive to a full deployment of BWCs, and training on
proper use of BWCs and other available technology, can positively impact efficiency
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Ultimately, however, officers must be compliant in
using and exploiting this technology’s capabilities to improve law enforcement
practices, particularly around maximizing output production while using the same
or fewer resources.
Improving police organizations’ efficiency can significantly impact budgetary
allocations in local government and police organizations to ensure proper allocation
of resources to maximize service delivery. Taken together, the results of this study
shed light on the effects that this technology has on police efficiency. Expanding on
this strand of research will become increasingly important in the growing body of
36
literature on the use of BWCs by law enforcement agencies.
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Annex-Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure 3: Yearly Adoption of BWCs
Notes: Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020).
Figure 4: Order-m Scores
Notes: Order-m efficiency scores without outlier agencies.
43
Figure 5: Efficiency by Agency Size
Notes: Order-m efficiency scores by agency size.
Figure 6: Bivariate Plot: Efficiency Scores vs. Efficiency Scores-Mean Normalized
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Table 6: Results-Sample with Efficiency Scores ⩽ 1
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.111∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.0790∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.0827∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0413) (0.0397) (0.0424) (0.0367) (0.0327) (0.0390) (0.0675)
Constant 0.517∗∗∗ 0.823 0.447
(0.0252) (0.557) (0.582)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 316 320 320
R2 0.02 0.13 0.12
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 760.27 (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 11.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates.
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 162.20, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates.
Notes: All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses
were done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 7: Results - Re-Analyses of Efficiency Scores and BWCs Effects
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.167∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.0.050∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0442) (0.0456) (0.0512) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0496) (0.0870)
Constant 0.360∗∗∗ 0.302 -0.252
(0.0204) (0.641) (0.677)
Observations 320 320 320 320 446 446 446 416 320 320
R2 0.01 0.23 0.20
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 760.27, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 11.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 162.20, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates. .
Notes: All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses
were done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 8: Results - Robustness Analyses-Outlier Agencies
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.0661 0.0208 0.0145 0.0391 0.0355 0.0273 -0.0147 0.000814 0.0501 0.0764
(0.0548) (0.0529) (0.0575) (0.0517) (0.0507) (0.117) (0.0521) (0.0851) (0.0463) (0.0713)
Constant 1.302∗∗∗ -0.933 -1.029
(0.0721) (0.711) (0.738)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 71 126 126
R2 0.00 0.44 0.42
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 742.95, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 117.03, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates. .
Notes: All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses
were done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 9: Results - Robustness Analyses-Normalized Input/Output Set
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.103*** 0.0892** 0.0919** 0.0969** 0.0916** 0.0684** 0.0763** 0.0940*** 0.110*** 0.184***
(0.0355) (0.0374) (0.0383) (0.0376) (0.0364) (0.0343) (0.0379) (0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0632)
Constant 0.608*** 0.0471 0.182
(0.0270) (0.432) (0.446)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446 446 446 416 446 446
R2 0.02 0.24 0.24
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 1271.66, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for maximum
bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 246.22, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for maximum
bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates. .
Notes: All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses were
done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 10: Order-m Efficiency Estimates- Mean Normalized
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall Efficiency Score 0.68 0.27 0.0003 2.40
Police agency (1-10 Officers) 0.78 0.30 0.25 1.00
Police agency (11-100 Officers) 0.57 0.38 0.006 1.16
Police agency (>100 Officers) 0.73 0.36 0.0003 2.40
Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020).
Table 11: Predicted Efficiency Scores- Mean Normalized
Non-Acquirers Acquirers Acquirers Deployers*,**
MD 0.618 0.721
PS 0.625 0.714
RM 0.623 0.715
NN-3 0.636 0.733
NN-5 0.641 0.732
RA 0.646 0.714
DWPS 0.63 0.706
CEM 0.607 0.701
IV 0.607 0.7619
IV-2 0.607 0.771
Avg. 0.62825 0.717 0.607 0.76645
Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
* Partial Deployment. ** Full Deployment.
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Table 12: Results - Robustness Analyses using a DEA model
DM1 PS2 RM3 NN-34 NN-55 RA-MD6 DWPS7 CEM8 IV9 IV-210
Efficiency 0.0732*** 0.0524** 0.0557** 0.0542** 0.0484* 0.0322 0.0481* 0.0501* 0.0584** 0.0975**
(0.0251) (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0264) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0283) (0.0473)
Constant 0.360*** 0.383 0.262
(0.0203) (0.338) (0.348)
Observations 446 446 446 446 446 446 446 415 446 446
R2 0.01 0.19 0.19
1 MD = Malahanobis Distance Matching.
2 PS = Propensity Score Matching.
3 RM = Propensity Score Ridge Matching.
4 NN-3 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (3).
5 NN-5 = Nearest Neighbor Matching (5).
6 RA-MD = Regression Adjustment.
7 DWPS = Doubly Weighted Propensity Score Matching.
8 CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching.
9 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression. First stage F-statistic, 1271.66, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates..
10 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression-2 First stage F-statistic, 246.22, (p < .01).
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified) is rejected.
Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or CraggDonald F) is 16.38 for
maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the maximal IV size (inconsistency) of OLS estimates. .
Notes: All matching methods except for CEM were done using Stata’s user-written command kmatch (Jann, 2019). The CEM analyses were
done using Stata’s user-written command CEM (King, 2019). Standard Errors in Parenthesis: significance *10%, **0.05%, ***0.01%
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 13: DEA Efficiency Estimates
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall Efficiency Score 0.41 0.27 0.0001 1.00
Police agency (1-10 Officers) 0.65 0.37 0.05 1.00
Police agency (11-100 Officers) 0.36 0.30 0.002 1.00
Police agency (>100 Officers) 0.41 0.24 0.0001 1.00
Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020).
Table 14: Predicted Efficiency Scores-DEA Model
Non-Acquirers Acquirers Acquirers Deployers*,**
MD 0.361 0.434
PS 0.368 0.420
RM 0.366 0.422
NN-3 0.372 0.426
NN-5 0.377 0.425
RA 0.389 0.421
DWPS 0.374 0.422
CEM 0.359 0.409
IV 0.358 0.446
IV-2 0.358 0.447
Avg. 0.370 0.422 0.358 0.446
Source: Own Analyses using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
* Partial Deployment. ** Full Deployment.
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Table 15: Rosenbaum Bounds
Γ sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.1490 0.1490 0.0796 0.2120
1.1 0.0002 0.0000 0.1310 0.1664 0.0595 0.2295
1.2 0.0009 0.0000 0.1133 0.1822 0.0439 0.2451
1.3 0.0037 0.0000 0.0971 0.1961 0.0277 0.2595
1.4 0.0114 0.0000 0.0815 0.2106 0.0127 0.2724
1.5 0.0286 0.0000 0.0667 0.2221 -0.0017 0.2850
1.6 0.0602 0.0000 0.0557 0.2346 -0.0137 0.2956
1.7 0.1099 0.0000 0.0445 0.2445 -0.0252 0.3063
1.8 0.1785 0.0000 0.0342 0.2536 -0.0371 0.3147
1.9 0.2636 0.0000 0.0233 0.2631 -0.0477 0.3247
2.0 0.3599 0.0000 0.0138 0.2713 -0.0583 0.3335
Γ- Log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors.
sig+-Upper bound significance level.
sig--Lower bound significance level.
t-hat+-Upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate.
t-hat--Lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate.
CI+-Upper bound confidence interval (a= .95).
CI--Lower bound confidence interval (a= .95).
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US
Census Bureau (2017).
Table 16: Simulated Confounder
Police Size Baseline Estimate Simulated Estimate Outcome Effect Selection Effect
Kernel Matching 0.114*** 0.112*** 1.44 1.525
Nearest Neighbor 0.057 0.106 1.576 1.538
Dashboard Cameras
Kernel Matching 0.114*** 0.114*** 1.081 1.833
Nearest Neighbor 0.056 0.11 1.045 1.829
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau (2017).
Estimates are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 17: Relative Correlation Restrictiions
ITT TOT
OLS point estimate ( λ = 0) 0.106*** 0.110***
(95% CI) (0.03,0.178) (0.04,0.183)
Bounds, 0 ⩽ λ ⩽ 0.1 [0.112,0.260] [0.29,0.444]
(95% CI) (0.09,0.106) (0.10,0.112)
Bounds, 0 ⩽ λ ⩽ 0.25 [-0.212,0.260] [-0.409, 0.444]
(95% CI) (0.065,0.106) (0.082,0.112)
Bounds, 0 ⩽ λ ⩽ 0.5 [-0.405,0.260] [-0.611,0.444]
(95% CI) (0.206,0.106) (0.050,0.112)
Bounds, 0 ⩽ λ ⩽ 1 [-0.920,0.260] [-1.00,0.444]
(95% CI) (-0.081,0.106) (-0202,0.112)
Bounds, 0 ⩽ λ ⩽ 2 [-3.10,0.260] [-1.883,0.444]
(95% CI) (-0.390,0.106) (-0.204,0.112)
λ∞ 2.82 3.34
λ(0) 0.61 2.94
Minimum λ for which bounds include zero 0.61 2.94
Source: Own analysis using BJS (2015), Kaplan (2020), and US Census Bureau
(2017).
Notes: λ is the assumed correlation between the treatment and the observed
variables. Bounds reflect the estimates of the adoption of BWCs (ITT and TOT)
on police efficiency. Intervals in brackets are the estimated rcr bounds and the
intervals in parenthesis are 95% asymptotic confidence intervals.
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